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I’
fit TRADITIONAL belief about rural credit
markets particularly agricultural credit
markets, is that small rural banks have limited
access to sources of funding and limited oppor-
tunities to lend outside their immediate commu-
nities. Rural banks’ ability to meet local loan
demand, so the theory goes, is constrained by a
relatively inelastic supply of local deposits and
insufficient access to nonlocal or national credit
markets. Moreover, such institutions tend to
experience deposit outflows during periods of
high seasonal loan demand as individuals with a
seasonal need for funds (like farmers) draw
down their deposit balances. To meet the
seasonal loan demand of such industries as
agriculture and tourism, many observers argue
that rural banks must keep a relatively high
proportion of their assets in low-interest-
bearing, highly liquid securities during other
times of the year.
The Seasonal Borrowing Privilege (SBP), one
ofthree Federal Reserve discount window pro-
grams, was designed to address this problem by
permitting banks with strong seasonal patterns
in loans or deposits to obtain funds from Feder-
al Reserve Banks. Although the program is high-
ly popular among participants, some observers
have questioned a key historical feature of the
SBP, as well as the program’s justification itself.
Noting that seasonal loans were made at a
below-market rate of interest (the discount
rate), critics have argued that the lack of credit
availability, even if it were a problem, was noreason for the Fed to step in and provide credit
at a subsidized rate.1 Other critics, citing the
tremendous innovations in financial markets
since the program began in 1973, have ques-
tioned whether rural banks continue to face
funding constraints today or whether they are
still the only source of credit for their commu-
nities.2 The criticism has increased with the
volume of lending through the SBP.
This article describes the seasonal borrowing
program and examines its usage by banks in the
Eighth Federal Reserve District from 1984
through l990.~The Eighth District has a large
number of agricultural banks; in some years,
District banks have accounted for as much as
one-third of all borrowings under the SBP. A
key question to be addressed is the extent to
which the program has fulfilled the objectives
set out by the Federal Reserve Board in 1973.
The article then presents an analysis of the
program’s continued necessity.
.I”iip’osi:E~tj ~
The seasonal borrowing program was estab-
lished in April 1973 by the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System (hereafter, the
Board) to help member banks meet seasonal
funding requirements. The program was adopt-
ed as part of amendments to Regulation A,
“Advances and Discounts by Federal Reserve
Banks,” which became effective April 19, 1973.
Under Section 201.2 of the revised Regulation
A, “General Principles,” the Board outlined its
rationale for the program:
Extending credit to member banks to accommo-
date commerce, industry, and agriculture is a
principal function of Reserve Banks Feder-
al Reserve credit is available for longer periods
(than adjustment credit) to assist a member
bank that lacks reasonably reliable access to na-
tional money markets in meeting seasonal
needs for funds arising from a combination of
expected patterns of movement in its deposits
and loans.~
The Board’s decision to establish the SlIP was
based in large part on the findings of a 1971
Federal Reserve study of the discount window.
In evaluating the sources and uses of funds at
small rural banks, the study found that
the available information supports the view that
small rut-at banks, concentrated in the sixth
through eleventh Federal Reserve districts, have
serious disadvantages relating to their organiza-
tional structure, In many cases the prohibition
of branching precludes growth to large size.
This restriction on growth and geographic ex-
pansion frequently results in a high degree of
deposit and asset specialization that promotes
variability in deposits and loans. Such variability
may be accommodated by holding relatively
large volumes of liquid assets or by borrowing.
If liquid assets are relied on, substantial por-
tions of bank assets may be unavailable for lo-
cal loans and the cost of lending will be
correspondingly higher.~
The study found that small unit banks in
rural areas, even those affiliated with cor-
respondents, faced limited access to funding
from the federal funds market and the certifi-
cate of deposit (CD) market, largely because of
information asymmetry among large and small
banks in these markets, In the study’s own
words, the
lack of readily available information about
smaller banks would, in general, tend to make
them higher-risk investments to potential
lenders, In particular, their lack of diversifica-
tion would increase the likelihood of problems
as seen by lenders, without any offset that
might be warranted by more detailed but costly
investigation.8
Program developers thought that providing a
reliable source of loanable funds would make it
easier for these banks to manage their assets
and liabilities, enabling them to better meet the
credit demands of their communities through-
out the year, that is, increase local lending. Be-
fore the program’s inception, banks with strong
seasonal fluctuations in loans relative to deposits
would accommodate seasonal needs by liquidat-
iThis argument lost most of its force in early 1992, when
banks that borrow seasonal credit began paying a market-
related interest rate.
2See, for example, Graham (1979) and Stevens (1990).
Stevens has also raised another issue: that unpredictable
shifts in seasonal borrowings have complicated the im-
plementation of monetary policy. See Stevens (1990) for a
discussion of this issue.
tThe Eighth Gistrict includes Arkansas, eastern Missouri,
the southern portions of Illinois and Indiana, the western
portions of Kentucky and Tennessee, and northern Mis-
sissippi-
4See Board (1973) for a reprint of the revised Regulation A.
5See Board (1971), pp. 64-65.
°Board(1971), p. 54.How the SBP Works
As illustrated in the “before” and “after”
balance sheets at right, the SBP allows a bank
to maintain a stable securities portfolio while
simultaneously increasing its loan portfolio.
Before the hypothetical bank obtains a
seasonal credit line with its local Reserve
Bank, its first- and third-quarter balance
sheets might look something like the left-hand
panels of the figure. Seasonal loan demand is
assumed to be low in the first quarter and
peak in the third quarter. With stable core
deposits and insufficient access to purchased
funds, the bank’s asset portfolio in the first
quarter would be composed of $50 in securi-
ties and $50 in loans ($20 in loans to seasonal
businesses and $30 in other loans). To meet
peak loan demand in the third quarter, the
bank would sell $20 of its securities portfolio
to fund an additional $20 of loans to busi-
nesses that need seasonal loans (bans to
seasonal businesses increase from $20 to $40,
while securities holdings fall from $50 to
$30). The bank’s loan-to-deposit ratio rises
from 50 percent in the first quarter to 70
percent in the third quarter.
After a bank becomes a seasonal borrower,
it can increase its loans to seasonal business-
es in the peak period of demand without
shrinking other assets (loans to seasonal busi-
ing some of their securities holdings. In periods
of seasonal loan demand, these banks would sell
securities, using the proceeds to fund loans.
When seasonal loans were repaid, securities
holdings would rise again.7 A description of
how the program affects asset and liability
management appears in the shaded insert
above.
Although the program has undergone a
number of changes since 1973, much of its
nesses increase from $20 to $40 while securi-
ties holdings stay constant); it can now fund
seasonal loans while increasing the bank’s to-
tal assets and liabilities by the amount of the
credit extension ($20). More importantly, the
bank is able to increase other loans at all
periods of the year: in both the first quarter
and the third quarter, the bank is able to car-
ry $50 in other loans compared with $30 be-
fore the bank becomes a seasonal borrower.
Its loan-to-deposit ratio rises from 70 percent
in the first quarter to 90 percent in the third
quarter. Note that these ratios are both
higher than those obtainable before the bank
became a seasonal borrower.
Also note that, in this example, the bank’s
ratio of seasonal loans to total loans actually
declined after the bank became a seasonal
borrower, because it did not use the SBP to
increase loans to seasonal businesses, It in-
stead increased the proportion of loans to
nonseasonal borrowers, Other outcomes, in-
cluding an increase in the proportion of loans
to seasonal businesses, are possible because a
bank presumably allocates seasonal borrow-
ings to maximize the return on its asset port-
folio. The composition of the asset portfolio
after borrowing, therefore, will vary by bank.
Most importantly, a borrowing bank is making
more loans than it did before using the SBP.
structure remains the same.8 To qualify, banks
must be small (less than $500 million in total
deposits) and able to demonstrate sizable and
recurring seasonal swings in net funds availabil-
ity, defined as total deposits less total loans. Af-
ter satisfying a portion of the seasonal need
from their own resources—that is, after meeting
a deductible—eligible banks may borrow funds
from their Federal Reserve Bank to bridge the
remaining gap for up to nine months each year,
paying a variable rate of interest,°All seasonal
‘See Graham (1979) and Stevens (1990) for more detail on
the historical rationale for the program.
8ln 1980, for instance, the program was open to nonmember
institutions as a result of the Monetary Control Act, The
amount of seasonal loan funding that banks are required to
meet from their own resources (the deductible) and the
maximum size of an eligible institution have changed
several times over the years. See Appendix A of Board
(1990) for more detail.
9The interest rate on outstanding seasonal credit is computed
as the average of the federal funds rate and the secondary
market rate on 90-day large CG5 over the previous reserve
maintenance period, rounded to the nearest five basis
points. This formula became effective January 9, 1992. In
prior years, banks participating in the SBP paid the basic
discount rate on outstanding credit, which afforded users a
subsidy when the discount rate was below market rates of
interest. The rationale for changingthe interest rate charged
on seasonal credit can be found in Board (1990), pp. 14-18.55
Balance Sheet of a Hypothetical Bank
Before and After Becoming a Seasonal Borrower
BEFORE AFTER
First Quarter First Quarter
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
Cas 1 10 Gepos~ts 100 Cash 10 Geposits 100
Secur;t’&s 50 Securities 30
Loans Cap~tai 10 Loans Capital
Loans to Loans •o
Seasonal Seasonal
Businessos 20 Businesses 20
Other Loans 30 Other Loans 50
Tolal Liaoilt Os Total Liabilities
rolal Assots 110 and Capilal 110 Total Assets 110 and Cap’tai 110
Third Quarter Third Quarter
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
Cash 10 Gepo0ns 100 Cash 10 Depos:ts 100
Secur.t.cs 30 Secur bes 30 Borrowings 20
Loans Capital 10 Loans Capital 10
Loans to Loans t
0 Seasonal Seasonal
BLsinosses 40 Businesses 40
Other Loans 30 — Otner Loans 50
:otal Liao,lities Total Liaal’t es
Tota, Assets 110 and Capital 110 lotal Assets arid Capilal 130
borrowings must be fully collateralized and
most have weekly or 30-day maturities; seasonal
loans can be rolled over provided program re-
quirements are being met. Program users are
permitted to sell federal funds while they are
borrowing seasonal credit, as long as net fed
funds sales (fed funds sold less fed funds pur-
chased) do not exceed the bank’s normal operat-
ing pattern, that is, the pattern that existed
before the bank became a seasonal horrower.’°
A more detailed description of the qualifying
process and the technical aspects of the pro-
gram is provided in the appendix.
0 .oon’owing
Seasonal borrowings in the Eighth District
(and elsewhere) have generally followed the
agricultural credit cycle, because most banks
that use the program face seasonal loan demand
from farmers. The amount of seasonal borrow-
ings outstanding typically rises during the
leA related indicator of a rural bank’s dependence on local
investments is its volume of sales in the federal funds mar-
ket. With limited local lending opportunities, small rural
banks may find the federal funds market to be their best
alternative use of deposits. While this behavior would seem
counter to the logic of the SB9 the program permits
banks, simultaneously, to sell fed funds and borrow from
the discount window. According to Melichar (1980), the
Board decided in 1976 to allow the sale of fed funds while
borrowing seasonal credit because most small banks had
become year-round sellers of fed funds. A great proportion
of these banks were keeping secondary reserves in fed
funds rather than Treasury bills at the same time their
overall liquidity was declining. In this context, fed funds
were being used to manage reserve requirements, rather
than as an alternative investment to loans. In addition,
because the bulk of the fed funds market consists of one-
day (or overnight) loans, program officials do not view it as
a perfect substitute for the long-term borrowing privilege
provided under the SBR/ /‘!,~‘///~ ~/////7// /// ,/ ~,// /
Figure 1
Average U.S. Weekly Seasonal Borrowings Outstanding,
1973~9O1
Millions of dollars
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spring when crops are planted, reaching a peak
in late summer when crops are harvested; they
decline during the fall and winter as farmers
receive payments for their crops and repay
their loans.
Program changes since the mid-1970s have
greatly expanded the number of banks that
qualify for seasonal credit, the time frame for
borrowing, and the size of seasonal lines that
qualifying banks can obtain.1~A key factor in-
fluencing the growth of the SUP during the
1980s was the passage of the Monetary Control
Act of 1930, which extended access to the dis-
count window to nonniember depository institu-
tions. Taken together, these changes led to an
increase in the number of banks participating in
the program (from 205 in 1973 to 615 in 1988),
and an increase in the amount of average weekly
credit outstanding (which rose from $89 million
to $235 million over the period). Figure 1 illus-
trates the trend in borrowings over the period
1973-90. These liberalizations in program 1-es,
tr’ictions on net seem to have increased ag-
gregate seasonal borrowing by increasing the
number of borrowers rather- than the amount
of credit extended to each borrower; average
borrowing per institution has remained almost
constant over time.22 Still, actual program usage
lisee Board (1990), Appendix B. Attachment A.
l2Though the level of borrowing peaked in 1986, the number
of seasonal borrowers peaked in 1989, when 721 banks
received seasonal borrowings. The amount of credit out-
standing reached an all-time high of $513 million during
the week ending July 26, 1989. Program usage subse-
quently declined in 1990 and 1991, Although the reasons
for declining usage are not known precisely, the slowing
economy and weak loan demand, combined with the
Board’s announcement that a market rate of interest would
be charged on seasonal borrowings beginning in 1992,
probably have been contributing factors.
1974 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 1990
Annual averages of weekly dala
SOURCE: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve SystemI
remains low relative to the number of banks
potentially qualified to use it.”
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Because the SUP is designed for relatively
small banks in areas dominated by a seasonal
industry, like agriculture or tourism, the mid-
western Federal Reserve districts—Chicago, Kan-
sas City, Minneapolis and St. Louis—host the vast
majority of program users. In the late 1980s,
Eighth District banks (St. Louis District banks)
were among the 5BPs largest users of seasonal
credit.” The amount of credit extended to these
banks has risen substantially in recent years as
the number of banks eligible for the program
and efforts to increase awareness of the pro-
gram by discount window officers have in-
creased.” Since 1984, the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis’ Credit Office has maintained a
database on all District institutions applying for
discount window credit, including seasonal
credit. These data may help provide an answer
to the question: Is the program meeting its
objectives?
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics on
District banks that participated in the program
from 1984 to 1990. In 1984, the first year for
which complete weekly data on seasonal bor-
rowers are available, 42 District banks partici-
pated in the program. The number of banks
using the program steadily increased through
the rest of the decade. By 1988, the number of
participants had more than tripled to 137. The
number of borr-owers peaked at 151 in 1989,
although the average weekly amount of seasonal
credit outstanding for that year’ was down from
the previous year. The average amount of bor-
rowings outstanding per week rose from
$18.8 million in 1984 to $94.9 million in 1988,
while the average size of the borrowing banks
peaked at $75.6 million in deposits in 1.987, then
declined to $57.5 million in 1990.
The annual average loan-to-deposit ratio for
seasonal borrowers was relatively constant over
the seven-year period, varying between 6 and
70 percent. Within any given year, however,
this ratio fluctuated substantially, ranging by as
many as 20 percentage points between its mini-
mum and maximum value. The loan-to-deposit
ratio typically climbed several percentage points
during the peak period of borrowing (defined in
table Ia safive-week period around the week
where borrowings outstanding peaked), as
banks funneled a great proportion of these box’-
rowings into loans. The intra-year relationship
between seasonal borrowings and the loan-to-
deposit ratio for 1989-90 (the year of peak
usage) is illustrated in figure 2 This
pronounced seasonal pattern and the close
correlation between the loan-to-deposit ratio and
seasonal box-rowings are consistent with one
justification for the program: a class of small
banks with strong seasonal loan and deposit
flows does exist.
A number of other characteristics of seasonal
borrowers are consistent with the rationale and
current application of the program. The ratio of
agricultural production loans to total loans, for
example, is not only higher for seasonal bor-
rowers than comparably sized nonborrowers,
but also shows considerably more intra-year
variability. In 1989, for example, the agricultural
loan ratio for program user-s showed a range of
almost 5 percentage points compared with the
1.3 percentage point range for nonborrowers.
Evidence of a seasonal shortfall of funds can
also be gleaned from data on fed funds pur-
chases and sales. Fed funds purchased tend to
be higher and fed funds sales tend to be lower
during the peak period of seasonal borrowing
than their average values over the course of the
year, indicating that banks face a liquidity short-
fall in the summer months.
These results are reinforced by comparing
seasonal borrowers with comparably sized non-
borrowers. Table 2 compares selected third
“Graham (1979) notes that the portion of eligible Ninth Dis-
trict banks borrowing seasonal credit declined from 19 per-
cent in 1974 to 11 percent in 1978. Yorke and Herman
(1982) note that, in the Tenth District, less than one-half of
eligible member institutions used the program (on average)
over the 1974-80 period. And Stevens (1990) estimates that
in 1988, when the level of seasonal borrowing reached its
peak, less than 20 percent of eligible banks nationwide
sought and obtained seasonal credit.
“See Graham (1979) and Yorke and Herman (1982) tor ana-
lyses of seasonal borrowing during the 1970s in the Ninth
and Tenth Federal Reserve Districts, respectively.
“These efforts were launched with a Board press release
dated March 12, 1985, which stated: ‘Reserve Banks will
be making special efforts to acquaint depository institutions
with both the regular and temporary seasonal credit facili-
ties?’ Subsequently, the St. Louis Credit Office sent gener-
al information mailings about the SBP to all Eighth District
banks and targeted mailings to certain institutions with
strong seasonal swings in deposits and loans- In addition,
an annual renewal letter is sent to all banks that qualified




Descriptive Statistics, Eighth District Seasonal Borrowing Program, 1984-90
(dollar amounts in millions)
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
42 47 51 88 137 151 124













Loan/deposit ratio (annual) 68 .70 65 .68
Minimum (week) .63 65 .63 .62
Maximum (week) 73 .85 68 .71
Peak five-week period .72 .74 67 .70
Seasonal borrowings
Minimum outstanding (week) $3.0 $3.5 $0,1 $03 $1.7 $152
Maximum outstanding (week) 49.2 479 473 895 209.8 188.1
Mean outstanding (week) 188 190 14.1 444 949 88.5
Agricultural loans!
total loans (annual range)
Borrowers 156-19.8% 124-16.2% 105-13.6% 88-11.4% 8.0-12.6% 8.4-13 3Wo
Nonborrowers1 11 4-127% 10,011 9% 9.4-11.0% 80-95% 7.6-9.0% 7.2-8.5%
Net fed funds purchased2 $31 5 $27.5 $52.4 $663 $18 8 $0.2
(mean week)
53 observations (53 Wednesdays)
District banks with total deposits of less than $500 million
2 A negative sign indicates that banks, on average were net sellers of fed funds
SOURCES Credit Office. Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis; FFIEC Reports of Condition forAll Insured Commercial
Banks, 198490.
quarter 1989 average balance sheet ratios for
Eighth District seasonal borrowers with those of
nonborrowers.’°In general, the composition of
program users’ assets and liabilities differs from
that of their nonborrowing peers (other District
banks with total deposits of less than $500 mil-
lion). Seasonal borrowers have significantly
higher ratios of loans to deposits (68 percent vs.
59.1 percent) and have a higher portion of their
loan portfolio invested in agricultural produc-
tion loans (13.3 percent vs. 8.6 percent) than do
nonborrowers.” As a result, seasonal borrowers
are less liquid than their peers, as measured by
the ratio of fed funds sold to assets, the ratio of
securities and fed funds sold to assets and the
ratio of total securities to deposits. In addition,
the higher purchased liabilities ratios (fed funds
purchased to total liabilities and purchased lia-
bilities to total liabilities) for seasonal borrowers
are consistent with the notion that they have a
funding need that is not being met by local
core deposits.
Another way to assess whether the SBP is
meeting its objectives is to examine changes in
the way banks operate after they begin using
the program. “Before borrowing” and “while
borrowing” balance sheet ratios of 42 District
banks that borrowed in both 1988 and 1989,
but not in 1986 or 1987, are presented in table
3 (first-quarter data) and table 4 (third-quarter
data). As predicted from our earlier hypothetical
bank model, banks that borrow seasonal credit
do record higher loan-to-deposit ratios than they
recorded in prior years, both in periods of low
loan demand and periods of peak loan demand.
For example, the average first quarter loan-to-
deposit ratio for this group of borrowers rose
from 57.5 percent before using the program to
61 percent while using the program.
T8The data are taken from the quarterly Reports of Condition
filed by all U.S. commercial banks.
l7The differences in mean values of the ratios for borrowers
and nonborrowers are statistically significant from zero at
the 99 percent confidence level.
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Before becoming seasonal borrowers, this first and third quarters. Correspondingly, these
group of banks increased its average loan-to- banks held fewer liquid assets in periods of
deposit ratio by about 3.5 percentage points slack loan demand, as predicted by the
between the first quarter and the third quarter. hypothetical bank model outlined in the shaded
They apparently funded this increased loan insert on pages 54 and 55.
ratio by rearranging their balance sheets, reduc- .. -
- .. . Based on the analysis outlined above, it
ing fed funds sold and securities holdings (from .- -
appears that the SlIP is meeting the objectives
36.7 percent of assets in the first quarter to -.. .. -
-- . specified by the Board in establishing the pro-
34.7 percent in the third quarter) and by .. .
-- gram: providincr a reliable line of credit to small increasing fed funds purchased (from 1.6 .
, institutions with seasonal loan demand to allow
percent of total liabilities in the first quarter to .
them to extend more loans to their communities
1.9 percent in the third quarter).
throughout the year. It seems clear that these
Once these banks began using the SBP, they banks used the SBP to increase their loan-to-
were able to record higher loan-to-deposit ratios deposit ratios.18 What remains unclear is
year-round and were able to increase the ratio whether they would have been able to
by almost 6.5 percentage points between the accomplish this without the SBP.
18Gespite these results, which appear to show that the rowing” ratios can be attributed to the SBR In other words,
program is working, care should be taken in interpreting it is possible that the banks’ behavior in the 1988 and 1989
them, Because of factors such as changes in economic period would have been the same in the absence of the
conditions over the 1986-89 period, it is uncertain how SBP
much change in the “before borrowing” and “while bor-Table 2
Average Values of Eighth District Bank Balance Sheet
Ratios, Third Quarter 1989
Seasonal Non-users of
borrowers seasonal credit1 t-statistic
Loans/ueposits GS04°/u 59 10% --7.97”
AgricullLrai loans/loans 1322 &55 4.25”
Fed ;Jnos sold/assets 2.04 495 lOu”
Fed fuids purchased/total liabiiit.os 1 75 0.96 —3.12”
Purchasoo liabilit’os/total !iao~l~tes 1.78 0.98 - 316”
Real estate agricultural loans/loans 655 773 193
Securities and fed funos solo/assets 31 97 3771 6.17”
~omr,erc.al and iqauslrial loans/loans 1721 15.41
Tmal securi~ios/aeposits 3497 3735 2.00’
n=149 n=1,089
NOTE- t-statistics am for non-zero dif4erences betwoen means.
With total deposils of less than $500 million
Sign’f’cant at tne 5 percont level
-- Significant at me 1 percenl level
SOURCE. FFlEC Roports of ~onoit’oi for All Insured ~ommerc.alBanks 1989
IS’ TIlE SLIP ~
Financial markets have changed dramatically
since the SBP was started in 1973. Most of these
changes have given banks greater access to
purchased funds. For example, the removal of
interest rate ceilings and the introduction of
new deposit instruments, such as NOW
accounts and MMDAs, have allowed banks to be
more competitive with both each other and
other financial institutions in bidding for
funds.19 Changes in market structure, especially
the absorption of independent banks into one-
or multibank holding companies and the growth
in statewide branching, together with innova-
tions like bankers’ banks, have provided addi-
tional sources of funds to small banks, both
urban and rural.20 These changes have made
rural banks less dependent on local sources
of funds.
In addition, the expanded availability of
agricultural credit from nonagricultural bank
sources such as cooperatives, the Farmers Home
Administration, a revamped Farm Credit System
and farm equipment companies, has diminished
the role of local banks in meeting the funding
needs of rural enterprises.2’ Thus, whether
19See Mishkin (1989), pp. 243-53, for a discussion of finan-
cial innovation at commercial banks since the early 1970s,
20Between 1980 and 1990, the proportion of small District
banks associated with holding companies rose from 12
percent to 70 percent; at the national level, the share rose
from 20 percent to 60 percent. Since 1975, 16 bankers’
banks (in 16 states) have opened their doors, These
cooperative depository institutions carry out many of the
ing the provision of federal funds to their members. The
Eighth District has four bankers’ banks, one each in Arkan-
sas, Illinois, Kentucky and Missouri. More recently, a num-
ber of U.S. banks eligible for seasonal credit have become
members of the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) System,




5ee, for example, Barkema and Drabenstott (1991), Sullivan
(1990) and Melichar (1984). services typically provided by correspondent banks, includ-Table 3
Two-Year Average Balance Sheet Ratios of Banks
Before and While Using the SBP
Low Loan Demand Period (first quarter)
Before borrowing While borrowing
(1986-87) (1988-89) t-statistlc
Loansfdeposits 57 52% 61.03% 2.94
Agricultural loans/loans B 95 7.46 —3 14 *
Fed funds sold/assets 62 9 3.54 —4.36
Fed funds purchased/total liabilities 1 58 1 76 0.59
Purchased liabilities/total liabilities 1 58 1.76 0.59
Real estate agricultural loans/loans 6 18 8.45 065
Securities and fed funds sold/assets 36 72 3547 1 25
Commercial and Industrial loans/loans 2309 2038 275*
Other loans/loans 61 78 65 71 348*
n—42 n—42
NOTE- t statistics are for non zero differences between means.
* Significant at the 5 percent level
Significant at the 1 percent level
SOURCE FFIEC Reports of Condition for All Insured Commercial Banks 1986-89
looking at the rural lender or borron ci fin’in- ture.-’ Table a shon s the composition of
cial inno~ ations during the past 20 years sug- seasonal horron ers b~location and structui e
gest at least some relaxation in any constraints from 1985 through 1990. \pproximatel~ one-
that might exit nhich therefore leads to ques quarter of all program usei nere located in
tions about the continuing nece it~of the SBP. metropolitan statistical areas (MSA5). 1nent~
One de~ elopment in pi ogram usage that raises of the 37 urban banks that borron ed in 1989
questions about the progi am continued neces- n crc located in the St. I ouis metropolitan area,
sitv in the St. louis District is the composition The ditersified nature of the economic base of
of the horron ing banks. Although the progi am MS \s like St. Loui makes it Ic s hkc1~that local
n as designed for small unit bank in iural binks are dependent on an~’ ingle industr\ fot
ai eas a significant portion of District easonal lending oppoi tunities or that horron ers ai e de-
born on ers in i ecent ears ha~ e been located pendent on a single source foi credit. Urban
in meti opolitan ai eas and a clcar majorit~ banks ma~choo e to specialize in a particular
ha~ e been part of a holding conlpan\ strut- categoi y of loans that exhibit seasonalit~ such
22This latter development is not unique to the Eighth District for the program indicate the program was targeted toward
Graham (1979) found that a significant portion of seasonal small, rural unit banks See Board (1971)
borrowers in the Ninth District over the 1974 to 1978 period 22The proportion of urban affiliated banks would no doubt be
were affiliates of multibank holding companies While the higher if rural banks that were part of a holding company
language of Regulation A does not preclude holding com with affiliates in metropolitan areas were included in the
pany and urban banks from participating in the SaP fi ures
studies completed in the early 1970s outlining a rationaleTable 4
Two-Year Average Balance Sheet Ratios of Banks
Before and While Using the SBP
Peak Loan Demand Period (third quarter)
Before borrowing While borrowing
(1986-87) (1 988-89) t-statistic
Loans/deposits 61.000/0 67.40% 4.89”
Agricultural loans/loans 11.55 12.17 0.75
Fed funds sold/assets 3.80 2.31
Fed funds purchased/total liabilities 1.86 2.10 1.13
Purchased liabilities/total liabilities 1.90 2.11 0.99
Real estate agricultural loans/loans 6,30 6.12 —0.43
Securities and fed funds sold/assets 34.74 32.92 — 2,25’
Commercial and industrial loans/loans 21 24 1880 —266
Other loans/loans 60 91 62 90 2 20
n=42 n=42
NOTE t statistics are for non zero differences between means
Significant at the 5 percent level
Significant at the 1 percent level
SOURCE FFIEC Reports of Condition for All Insured Commercial Banks 1986-89
as construction loans. It is not clear that the
SEP was designed to provide assistance to banks
that make this choice, however, It is even less
clear that loan specialization should be
encouraged, since it makes banks vulnerable to
large losses should the industry suffer a down-
turn.24 Moreover, urban banks would likely
have access to regional if not national funding
markets -
Independent banks (those not affiliated with a
holding company) have accounted for less than
20 percent of the District’s seasonal borrowers
since 1986. In contrast, just under one-third of
seasonal borrowers over the 1985-90 period
were affiliated with nlultibank holding compa-
nies. Table 6 shows the composition of bank
holding companies with District seasonal bor-
rowing subsidiaries, by size. While the majority
of these holding companies were small, with
two or three banks and consolidated deposits of
less than $500 million, a number of them were
very large, with five to 39 affiliates and consoli-
dated deposits in the $1-hillion-to-$10-billion
range. Banks that belong to a holding company,
especially a large one, are thought to have bet-
ter access to funding and capital niarkets, and
studies have shown that holding companies are
net suppliers of credit to their bank subsidi-
aries.25 If this is the case, some of these borrow-
ing banks may have alternatives to the SBP.
Further support for the notion that the
seasonal borrowers in the latter half of the
liabilities on their balance sheets in years when they bor-
rowed seasonal credit. In some years, a few independent
banks were able to tap the brokered deposit market, too.
24See, for example, Belongia and Gilbert (1987).
25See, for example, Rose and Talley (1983). It is also
interesting to note that, over the period, several holding
company banks (as many as five) had brokered depositTable 5
Composition of Seasonal Borrowers
by Location and Structure, 1985-90
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Banks in metropolitan areas 12 15 31 40 37 25
Percent of total (25.5) (2&4) (35 2) (29.2) (24.5) (226)
Independent banks 12 8 14 24 30 17
Percent of total (255) (15.7) (15.9) (17.5) (19.9) (13.7)
One-bank holding company banks 25 28 45 73 74 71
Percent of total (532) (54.9) (51 1) (53.3) (490) (57.3)
Multibank holding company banks 10 15 29 40 47 36
Percent of total (213) (294) (33.0) (292) (311) (2~0)
Total banks 47 51 85 137 151 124
SOURCE FFIEC Reports of Condition for All Insured Commercial Banks, 1985-90
Table 6
U~SBank Holding Companies with Eighth District
Seasonal Borrowing Subsidiaries
Consolidated deposits 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Less than $200 million 28 32 55 83 92 85
Percent of total (875) (800) (833) (838) (868) (887)
$200 million $500 million i 966
Percent of total (31) (10.0) (10.6) (91) (57) (62)
$500 million $1 billion 0 11 222
Percent of total (0) (2.5) (15) (20) (1.9) (2.1)
Greater than $1 billion 3335 6 a
Percent of total (94) (7.5) (4.6) (51) (57) (3.1)
Total holding companies 32 40 66 99 lOs 97
SOURC FFIEC Reports of Condition for All Insured Commercial Banks, 1985-90
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Branching Status of Eighth District Seasonal Borrowers
1985 1986 1987 1958 1989 1990
Independent banks
Nobranches 23468 5
Onebranch 526 1 0 ii 6
Multiple branches 5 3 4 8 11 6
Bank holding company banks
No branches 4 9 16 24 28 32
One branch 7 Il 23 30 36 29
Multiple branches 24 23 35 59 57 45
All banks
No branches 61 22 03 03 63 7
Percent of total (12.8) (23-5) (22.7) (21.9) (23.8) (29.8)
One branch 12 13 29 40 47 35
Percent of total (25.5) (25.5) (33.0) (29.2) (311) (28.2)
Multiple branches 29 26 39 67 68 52
Percent of total (61.7) (51.0) (44.3) (48.9) (45.0) (41.9)
Total seasonal borrowers 47 51 88 137 151 124
SOURCE: FFIEC Reports of Condition for All Insured Commercial Banks, 1985-90,
tap national markets for purchased liabilities.
Taken together, however, the evidence on the
location, structure arid branching status of Eighth
District seasonal borrowers raises the possihilily
that the program is being used by banks that
have access to alternative sources of credit.
The Federal Reserve’s seasonal borrowing pro-
gram was enacted in 1973 to help small rural
banks fund seasonal loan demand, thereby
ensuring that local credit needs were being met,
especialb’ in agi-icuiture. Program use increased
dramatically in the 1980s, as the number of
eligible institutions and awareness of the pro-
gram increased. Within the Eighth District, the
number of banks using the program almost
quadrupled between 1984 and 1989, before
declining in I 990 and 1991. While financial
innovations during the last 20 years have
provided both borrowers and lenders with a
xvider array of funding opportunities, the
program continues to operate because of a
belief that small rural banks still find it difficult
to accommodate seasonal loan demand.
An analysis of differences in balance sheet
composition hetxveen Eighth District banks that
ust~the SBP and those that do not was generally
supportive of the program. Seasonal hoi-rowers
had higher loan-to-deposit ratios, higher ratios
of fed funds purchased to total liabilities and
lower ratios of feel funds sold to assets than
nonhorrowing banks. An analysis of balance
sheet ratios for a group of banks that used the
program in both 1988 and 1989, hut not in
1986 or 1987, shox•ved that in general, banks
behaved as expected while borrowing: the~’
recorded higher loan-to-deposit ratios in both
loxx’ and peak demand periods.
The evidence of success is not unqualified,
however, because no one can he sure how
these banks would have behaved in the absence
of the seasonal borrowing program Moreover,
it is impossible to say whether SUP users still
lack reliable access to national credit markets.
Given the relatively high proportion of recent
program users that are located in urban at-eas,
have branches and are holding company affili-
ates, a closer look at their alternative sources of
credit seems xvarranted. ‘I’he recent introduc-
tion of a mat-ket-related interest i-ate that
reduces or eliminates the interest rate suhsidy
to borrowing banks, however, may weed out
banks that have ready access to alternative
sources of credit.65
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Banks with sizable and recurring seasonal
movements in their loans or deposits are eligible
to apply lot’ seasonal credit. Potentially eligible
banks supply their local Reserve Bank with
several years of monthly deposit and loan data.
l”roni these data, the estimated net funds availa-
bility (NFA) is calculated by subtracting total
deposits from total loans for each month and
each year of data supplied. A monthly average
NFA (based on tx•vo to five years of monthly
data) is then computed. The seasonal funding
need for each month is calculated as the differ-
ence between the average monthly NFA and the
largest, or peak, average monthly NFA.
A graduated deductible is then applied to
determine the amount of credit the borrowing
bank can obtain on a month-to-month basis.
The deductible is equal to 2 percent of the first
$100 million of average deposits of the preceding
calendar year, (3 percent of the next $100 million,
and 10 percent of the excess over $200 million.
For example, a bank with average annual
deposits of $150 million in the previous year
would have a deductible equal to $5 tiiillion
[($100 million x .02) + ($50 million x .06)].
Because of this graduated formula, few institu-
tions with deposits of more than $200 million
have a seasonal need that sw-passes the
deductible, so they rarely qualify to borroxv.
Normally, seasonal borroxvings are advanced
xvith maturities up to 30 days. At mnaturitv, the
borrowing bank pays all interest accrued on the
outstanding Loan. Provided it still qualifies for a
seasonal credit line, the bank may renew the
loan, and continue to do so for up to nine
months. Seasonal borrowings are usually
collateralized with U.S. ‘l’reasurv or agency
securities. Some larger borrowers (with mnoi-e
than $100 million in deposits) secure their credit
lines with municipal securities or one-to-four-
family mortgages.
At the time the seasonal credit line is
approved, the borrowing hank is advised of its
maximum net fed funds position and its net
investment position. The net fed funds position
is calculated as the difference between fed
funds sold and fed funds purchased over the
seasonal period. The net investment position is
calculated by adding the bank’s avet-age securi-
ties held to the daily average net fed funds sold
during the season. The net investment position
gives a borrowing bank flexibility in managing
its liquid assets, as long as its overall liquidityposition stays the same. Banks that exceed their
limit are contacted by discount window officers
when such violations are considered excessive.
Banks that knowingly and continuously violate
their limits face, among other penalties, non-
renewal of seasonal lines in suhsequent years.
In addition to theit’ net fed funds and net
investment limits, seasonal borrowers are also
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advised that the borrowed funds are not to be
used to purchase out-of-territory loans or loan
participations from other institutions. in addi-
tion, affiliates of multihank holding companies
are advised that seasonal credit is not to be
used to fund operations of the parent holding
company or any other affiliate.